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This paper presents an abstract architecture capturing the most essential characteristics
of security architectures for the kind of access control required in multi-agent systems.
A security architecture is usually component based; it is dynamically extensible, reﬂective,
and should be able to support a variety of policy strategies and enforcement mechanisms.
Therefore, in designing and implementing such an architecture, it is important to accurately
describe its structure, components, and their interactions; and we should also provide
support for verifying properties that the architecture must satisfy. The abstract Dynamic
Access Control Architecture, or DACA, we propose provides the ﬂexibility to express several
complex characteristics abstractly, ultimately resulting in a more structured foundation for
implementing security architectures for access control.
Crown Copyright © 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, access control models need to handle access scenarios in many applications, e.g., within multi-agent sys-
tems [12], SOAs (service oriented architectures) [15], business ecosystems [13], and VO (Virtual Organizations) [7,16], where
the security requirements, context and even the architecture itself can be highly dynamic. In such an environment, systems
that rely on a large amount of assumed knowledge or pre-conﬁguration will result in inﬂexibility that will unnecessarily
impede both the systems and their users. As a result, for each circumstance in which an entity could access an agent or
service, the user will not be provided with the best service possible, nor will the best security be employed. There is a
number of papers [8,10,9] that outline alternative approaches to achieving adaptive and context-sensitive access control.
However, more generic methods and techniques to handle practical problems within various access control scenarios are
still highly desirable.
Traditional access control models resolve access requests by giving boolean answers—Yes (access permitted) or No (access
denied) [2–4]. While at the most abstract level, this is always the case: either access is gained or it is not, and boolean
decision-making is often ingrained at the architectural and implementation layers also. However in the real world, decision-
making is not so simple. It often involves negotiation, and the resultant decision may be based on a modiﬁed form of the
original request. Such modiﬁcations may include: limitations on the extent of access granted; obligations a user must fulﬁll
before, during and/or after the access; conditions under which the access can take place (for example, mechanisms that
must be used to protect the access while in progress); additional approvals that are required before access can be granted,
and so on.
Although traditional access control models, such as MAC, DAC, and RBAC, may be modiﬁed to address some aspects of
real-world decision-making, they often decrease the granularity at which access decisions can be made, and/or signiﬁcantly
increase the degree of pre-conﬁguration required. We therefore need to form components of a more comprehensive and
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240 C. Liu et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 239–249ﬂexible model that allows for the inclusion of a broader range of access control concepts and is supported by a generic
architecture in which any of these concepts may or may not be present in instantiation.
Barker [1] presents an abstract model for access control that seeks to encapsulate the intention of all access control
models. However, in order to enable a more direct reﬁnement to code, we prefer to use a formal model at a level of ab-
straction that explicitly encapsulates the structures deﬁned by the ISO10181-3 international standard for access control [18],
to which we strive to comply.
Further to our desire for a model more directly mapped to the implementation, we make a distinction between those
parts of the policy that are static and those that are dynamic (based on observations of the environment). This is because, in
practice, we have static policies that are used within multiple contexts, but our dynamic policies are speciﬁc to the context
and will be applied in addition to static policies.
Our approach focuses on extending and reﬁning the architecture and structures deﬁned in the ISO10181-3 standard for
access control [18], in order to support the kind of ﬁne-grained, context-sensitive and adaptive access control required in
multi-agent systems. The access control architecture discussed in this paper will focus on addressing quantiﬁed/conditional
access decisions, such as “Yes, but only if . . .”; collaborative decision-making, such as “Yes, with the agreement of . . .”;
measurable risk/reputation/trust factors; and modiﬁable policy and/or policy generation for effectively solving contextual
conﬂicts. The meta-level structure of an access control architecture could allow the semantics of the operations of the
security model to be changed dynamically.
We propose a Dynamic Access Control Architecture (DACA) that describes the meta-level abstract structure of security
architectures. The DACA identiﬁes the essential ingredients and describes the relationships between these ingredients, pro-
viding the basis for the design, analysis, and implementation of security architectures.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the access control security framework. Section 3
presents the abstract model, we ﬁrst give a formal deﬁnition of the abstract DACA, then discuss the method for expressing
access control policy and functions. Section 4 discusses the most essential properties that a successful model should pos-
sess. In Section 5, we discuss architecture design at the abstract level, and show that speciﬁc access control decision and
enforcement functions deﬁned in the way we provide can satisfy the required properties. Section 6 discusses the implemen-
tation of a practical system based on our abstract model, and demonstrates how to use the model checking technique for
the correctness analysis in the implementation process. The last section concludes the paper with a short discussion about
possible future work.
2. Access control security framework
The abstract DACA we propose in this paper is based on the access control security framework, deﬁned by ISO/IEC (Inter-
national Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission) in 1996. The ISO 10181 standard [18]
gives a series of security frameworks, including authentication, access control, non-repudiation, conﬁdentiality, data integrity,
and audit. This paper in particular concerns part three of the standard: the Access Control (AC) framework.
The idea motivating the AC framework is that access by users (initiators) to resources (targets) may be controlled. It
suggests that, at an abstract level, we might be able to identify four components involved for any given request:
• the initiator,
• the target,
• an access control enforcement function (ACEF), and
• an access control decision function (ACDF).
The ACEF controls access to the target based on a decision, and the ACDF makes a decision for the ACEF. In multi-agent
systems, ACEFs provide a protective interface between initiators and agents (or targets).
We also explicitly identify two components necessary for providing an abstract model (ISO10181-3 refers to context and
policy information but does not identify from where it comes):
• a database to store information for authentication or other related purposes, and
• a policy generator (PG) deriving/specifying conditions that determine whether access by initiators to targets is permitted.
Note that the PG holds/derives a certain policy which can be used by ACDF for decision making. On the other hand, at any
time the PG can be viewed simply as the certain policy used by ACDF for decision making at the given time. With this view,
we may simply call PG a policy (see Section 3).
Fig. 1 illustrates the desired conﬁguration for a client/server architecture. The ACEF acts as a protective interface between
the initiator and the target, and forwards access control requests to the ACDF for consideration; decision making by the
ACDF is based on the database and policy generator.
The AC security framework suggests the basic structure for a single access control system. However, we view a practical
dynamic distributed access control system as the combination of several such systems. Fig. 2 illustrates such a system that
is a combination of three constituent access control systems: a printer, a coffee server and a role server.
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Fig. 2. An example access control architecture.
3. Abstract DACA
This section presents the abstract dynamic access control architecture (DACA).
3.1. A formal deﬁnition
Although the components of an architecture may be highly dynamic and distributed in nature, at an abstract level we
can represent the access control architecture by a structure (composed of the entities described in Section 2) deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A dynamic access control architecture (DACA) is a structure 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉, where U is a set of users, T a
set of targets, P a set of policies, D a set of databases, F a set of ACDFs, and G a set of ACEFs, satisfying the following
conditions:
1. u ∈ U denotes a user or a group of individuals bundled as a single user in some cases;
2. for any target t ∈ T , there is a set of services it may provide;
3. for any t ∈ T , there is a policy pt ∈ P that derives/speciﬁes the local policy regarding access to t (where P may contain
the global policy that is associated with local policies to control the system, i.e., any pt may contain the global policy
as a part of it);
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related purposes; and
5. each target t ∈ T has its own ACDF and ACEF, that is, there are ft ∈ F and gt ∈ G , where ft and gt , called the access
control decision function and the access control enforcement function respectively, together with the architecture form
a security mechanism to control access to the target.
We call the structure 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 a dynamic access control architecture, since the components contained in it may
dynamically change over time and the architecture itself can therefore be highly dynamic.
Note that service types could be any kind of service that a target may provide. Generally we assume that, for a target
t ∈ T , there is a set St = {s1, . . . , s j} associated with it, containing all services that t may provide. For example, a print
server may have a set S of two services: color printing and black-and-white printing (S = {colour,bw}).
Access control policy and access control functions are regarded as the most essential components in the architecture.
Their formal deﬁnitions are given below.
3.2. Access control policy and policy generation
The policy regarding access of a target speciﬁes the conditions under which a user can receive a particular service from
the target. Formally, we have
Deﬁnition 2. An access control policy rule has the following form:
allowAccessFor(u, t, s) → C1 & · · · & Cn,
which is read as “User u is allowed to access target t for receiving service s only if conditions C1 through Cn hold”. At any
given time, pt , as the policy associated with target t , is the set that consists of all rules regarding access of the services
that t provides.
Note that pt is in fact a policy generator associated with t . It may derive a new policy rule for access control at a time
when necessary.
Example 1. A ﬁle server, named FS, might have a policy consisting of two rules given as follows:
r1: allowAccessFor(u, FS, read) → is_member(u).
r2: allowAccessFor(u, FS,write) → clearedFor(u, FS) & adminFor(u, FS).
Here three predicates are adopted: is_member(u) means “u is a member of the organization”, clearedFor(u, FS) means “u
holds clearance for FS”, and adminFor(u, FS) means “u is the administrator for FS”.
With a negotiable request for service “read” from members of a friend organization, the policy generator pFS may derive
a new rule for r1 (r1′ below):
r1′: allowAccessFor(u, FS, read) → is_member(u) | (is_friend(u) & clearedFor(u, FS)).
It says that u is allowed to access FS for service “read” only if u is a member (of the organization) or is a friend and holds
a clearance for FS.
In the new rule r1′ , there is only one condition:
is_member(u) | (is_friend(u) & clearedFor(u, FS)).
Within practical applications, the conditions in some access control policy rules could be even more complex. However,
in any case, the form of access control rules given in Deﬁnition 1 is suﬃcient to express various conditions in addressing
qualiﬁed/conditional decisions and collaborative decision-making.
The conditions involved in a policy will depend on the speciﬁc application. We are particularly interested in those
conditions that directly relate to security, including risk, reputation, cost, etc. For example, with a service, st ∈ St , we may
have a rule as follows:
allowAccessFor
(
u, t, st
)→ (risk 0.2) & (reputation(u) 0.8) & ((is_member(u) & cost = 5) | cost = 15).
In the following, without a particular explanation, st is always used to denote a (speciﬁc) service provided by the target t
(note that, to avoid the confusion that may arise, we would never intend to use st to denote an element in the set St =
{s1, . . . , s j}).
Investigating suitable rules for inclusion in a policy involves many aspects, including: how to model the relation between
trust/reputation and risk in DACAs; how to obtain such quantitative values for determining whether a condition holds; and
what kind of tools we need to provide for supporting the formalization of the rules. However, this paper focuses on a format
for general policy rules in the abstract architecture to support the design of DACAs. We leave the discussion of these issues
for future work.
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The AC (decision and enforcement) functions associated with a target formally represent the behavior of the mechanism
used to enforce its policy. AC functions can be viewed as a formal representation of the security mechanism attached to
the target. Such a mechanism may consist of a set of security devices/agents. Therefore, the AC functions should reﬂect
the activities of those devices/agents that enforce the security policy, and used to express the behavior of the security
mechanism. There are two kinds of behavior that a security mechanism may perform:
• observing service states of the target for making decisions based on the security policy and relevant information, and
• executing actions corresponding to the decisions made through the AC decision function.
As we can see, the two kinds of behavior should be involved in the expressions of AC decision and enforcement functions
respectively.
An AC decision function for a target is applied to make decisions on requests of accessing the target for services.
Decision making is based on the policy and relevant information and the results observed by the security mechanism.
Therefore, it is important to identify those essential factors that must be observed in deﬁning the AC functions. For a tar-
get t ∈ T , if v1, . . . , vr are identiﬁed to be the essential factors involved in AC functions, then these factors form a vector,
o = (v1, . . . , vr). We call o the observed vector associated with t . Accordingly, a vector space that o will range over must
also be identiﬁed which depends on the possible states of each component of the vector. In addition, there must also be an
answer set that contains all possible decisions to access requests.
Based on this discussion, we deﬁne the AC decision function as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Given a target t ∈ T , let St be the set of all services that t can provide. Then, the AC decision function associated
with t , denoted by ft , is a map of the form:
ft :U × St pt+dt−→ (O → A),
where U × St is the request set (a pair (u, st) belonging to the set is called a request); pt and dt are the policy and the
database, respectively, associated with t , and
pt+dt−→ means that the mapping is based on pt while consulting dt ; O is the
observation vector space conducted by the security mechanism attached to t; and A is the answer set of ft that contains all
possible (types of) decisions.
A decision function whose answer set contains only No (i.e., the request is denied) is limited, although such a function
may satisfy security requirements. In general, the simplest answer set is the one that contains two elements, No and Yes.
With this answer set, if ft(u, st)(o) = Yes, then the request (u, st) is accepted, (based on the policy pt while consulting dt
and the value of the observation vector, o), otherwise it is denied. More generally, we may have A = {a1, . . . ,ak} that may
contain more than two answers.
To deﬁne the AC enforcement function for a target, we need to identify possible actions that the security mechanism
may execute. We call the set consisting of all these actions the execution space. For any request at a given state of the target,
the enforcement function should map the decision made through the decision function to a corresponding action that the
security mechanism executes. Therefore, the AC enforcement function in fact plays the role of executing a function that
performs the actions based on the decisions made by the AC decision function. Thus, formally we have:
Deﬁnition 4. Given a target t ∈ T , the AC enforcement function associated with t , denoted by gt , is a map of the form
gt :U × St × O −→
({ ft} −→ E)
where ft is the AC decision function deﬁned as above, and E is the execution space of gt .
The design of an execution space also depends on the requirements of real applications. But in any case, for a tar-
get t , assume A = {a1, . . . ,ak} and E = {e1, . . . , em}, then, if ft(u, st)(o) = a (a ∈ A), there is an action e ∈ E such that
gt(u, st ,o)(a) = e. Generally, an action (i.e., an element of the execution space) may consist of a sequence of activities that
the security mechanism may take. For simplicity we identify such a sequence of activities as a single atomic action that a
mechanism can execute.
Example 2. Consider an example target—a security room, named sr, for which Ssr = {S_View, R_View}, meaning that sr pro-
vides two types of services, S_View (for users to view SECRET ﬁles in the room), and R_View (for users to view RESTRICTED
ﬁles in the room). Assume that the mechanism for sr includes (see Fig. 3)
• two doors (one who wants to enter the room must pass through the two successive doors),
• a camera, CA1, located between the two doors for checking/reporting whether someone is there,
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• a second camera, CA2, located in the room for checking/reporting whether there is a vacancy, and
• a monitor, MO, in the room used to check the status of the room (whether there are ﬁles displayed and to identify the
classiﬁcation of the ﬁles).
Then the observation vector can be o = (vca1, vca2, vmo), where vc1, vc2 and vm represent the results observed by camera
CA1, camera CA2 and monitor MO respectively. We assume vca1 has two possible states, empty and occupied; vca2 also two
states, full and not_full; and vmo three states, S_ View, R_View and nil, where full means that the number of people in the
room has reached the maximum, and nil means there is nothing displayed. Then the vector space of observations contains
12 (2 × 2 × 3) elements. Thus, for example, (empty, full, S_View) is a value of the observation vector o, which means that,
at the time of observing, nobody is in the area between the two doors, the room is fully occupied, and a SECRET ﬁle is
currently displayed in the room.
Further, we assume the answer set with the decision function for sr is, e.g.,
A = {No,Yes,WaitForServiceAvailable,YesButGetAgreementFirst}.
Thus, if, for instance, when o = (empty, full, S_View) we may have
fsr(alice, S_View)(o) = WaitForServiceAvailable,
then the corresponding action that the AC enforcement function gsr performs may have the form:
AccessPermittedPleaseWait,
which is an element in the execution space of gsr .
4. System properties of a model
With the abstract model of a system, it is important to make sure that the model satisﬁes a certain set of properties
required for speciﬁc applications so that the system designer can follow the model to implement it. What properties should
be satisﬁed by the abstract dynamic access control architecture, and how to make the abstract architecture satisfy these
properties required, are the most important issues.
In the model Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉, the most essential components are P , F and G , which play important roles in
the model. We therefore center our discussion on the three components and focus on the formalization of policy and
the design of the AC functions. With policy, we need to consider whether a (local) policy reﬂects the requirements of a
speciﬁc application to which the policy applies, and whether the policy is consistent with the global policy and other (local)
policies. Regarding AC functions, we must consider whether these functions implement policies and the properties required.
All these may depend on practical applications. But at the abstract level, the formal requirements for a model must involve
the following system properties:
Property 1 (Policy consistency). Let Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 be an abstract DACA. If P |	 ⊥, i.e., there is no contradiction within P ,
the set of policies, then we say that the abstract architecture satisﬁes the property of policy consistency.
Property 2 (AC function correctness). Let Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 be an abstract DACA. If, for any u ∈ U and any t ∈ T , we have
Θ |	(doAccessFor(u, t, st)→ C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn),
C. Liu et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 239–249 245where is the standard temporal operator and read as “always”, st is any service that t may provide, and C1, . . . ,Cn are the conditions
in the policy
allowAccessFor
(
u, t, st
)→ C1 & · · · & Cn,
then we say that the abstract architecture satisﬁes the property of AC function correctness.
That is, in an abstract DACA or, simply, a model that satisﬁes AC function correctness, it is always true that, if one
accesses a target to get a service, then the minimum requirement (e.g., C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn as above) for the user to access the
target for receiving the service must be satisﬁed. In other words, any (local) policy is never violated in such a model.
With the property of AC function correctness, we may sometimes adopt a stronger form in the implementation of a
DACA as follows:
Θ |	(doAccessFor(u, t, st)→ allowAccessFor(u, t, st)).
That is, under this model, if anyone accesses t for a service st , he/she must be allowed to access t for the service, then we
say that the model satisﬁes the property of AC function correctness.
Considering the architecture as a whole system, the global policy must also not be violated, i.e., we should have Θ |	 ¬p,
where p is the global policy of the model. Fortunately, if a model satisﬁes the property of policy consistency, ¬p could not
be reached from it.
Property 3 (Special-required property). Let Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 be an abstract DACA, and assume that the speciﬁc architecture
has a set of requirements, SPE . Then if, for all α ∈ SPE ,
Θ |	 α,
we say that the abstract architecture satisﬁes the special-required property.
Deﬁnition 5. Let Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 be an abstract DACA. If the model satisﬁes Properties 1, 2, and 3, then it is a
successful model with respect to the speciﬁc application; otherwise, it is a failing model.
5. Architecture design at the abstract level
In implementing a DACA, the majority of work involves how to form security policies for the DACA, how to formalize the
policies, and how to design AC functions for enforcing these policies. In this section, focusing on policy and AC functions, we
discuss architecture design at the abstract level; whereas, in the next section, we investigate how to map abstract designs
to practical applications.
5.1. A standard form for access policy rules
Given the abstract DACA 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉, let t ∈ T and set St contain all types of services t can provide. Then, for
any service st ∈ St , at any time there should be a certain policy rule in pt , regarding access of users for the service. At the
abstract level, the rule has the standard form as follows:
allowAccessFor
(
u, t, st
)→ C1(u, t, st)∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st),
where Ci(u, t, st) (i = 1, . . . ,n) has a value of true or false that can certainly be determined based on the architecture.
With St = {s1, . . . , s j}, then at the abstract level the local policy pt associated with the target t contains the following
policy rules:
allowAccessFor(u, t, s1) → C11(u, t, s1) ∧ · · · ∧ C1n1(u, t, s1).
. . .
allowAccessFor(u, t, s j) → C j1(u, t, s j) ∧ · · · ∧ C jn j (u, t, s j).
As we said before, pt may also contain the global policy as a part of it. The abstract global policy can be expressed as
follows:
allowAccessFor(u, t, s) → GC(u, t, s),
where GC(u, t, s) is the global condition. The rule means that, if someone is allowed to access a target for a service the
target can provide, the global condition must be satisﬁed.
At the abstract level, we always view the policy rules having the standard form. However, in practical applications, apart
from standard policy rules, we may need some auxiliary policy rules (see next section).
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To design a successful model for the DACA, the more diﬃcult work is to deﬁne appropriate AC decision and enforcement
functions.
Let Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 be an abstract DACA. For the target t ∈ T , assume that there are r key factors related to t
that need to be observed by its security mechanism. Then there is a vector o = (v1, . . . , vr), that must be observed by ft
when making decisions to user requests. Let O = {o1, . . . ,ow} be the vector space, over which vector o ranges. Further, let
A = {a1, . . . ,ak} be the answer set with a1 = No.
Then, an abstract decision function can be deﬁned as:
ft
(
u, st
)
(o) =
{
a1 when P ,
a(i)(a(i) ∈ A) when Q ,
where P stands for “C1(u, t, st)∧· · ·∧Cn(u, t, st) = false and for any o ∈ O”, and Q stands for “C1(u, t, st)∧· · ·∧Cn(u, t, st) =
true and for o = oi where oi ∈ O (1 i  w)”.
Based on this deﬁnition, if not all of the conditions are satisﬁed (i.e., C1(u, t, st) ∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st) is false), the request
(u, st) is not accepted (the decision is a1, or No), regardless of the value of the observation vector o. Whereas, when all
conditions are satisﬁed (C1(u, t, st) ∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st) is true), the decision needs to consider the environment, captured by
the observation vector o. In general, the answer a(i) corresponding to oi won’t be a1 (No). Note that a(i) is not the same as
ai , although in some cases we may have a(i) = ai .
To deﬁne the AC enforcement function, the execution space needs to be identiﬁed/designed. We assume the following
execution space
E = {e1, . . . , em}
with the assumption that e1 = (deny the request, keep u away from t). This assumption above is made by the same reason
as for the answer set.
With the same idea, we deﬁne an abstract enforcement function as:
gt(u, st ,o)( ft) =
{
e1 when P ,
e(i)(e(i) ∈ E) when Q ,
where P stands for “ ft(u, st)(o) = a1”, Q stands for “ ft(u, st)(o) = ai(i = 1)”, and e1 is therefore the element in the execu-
tion space E that speciﬁcally corresponds to a1.
According to this deﬁnition, if the decision made through the decision function is a1 (i.e., No), then action e1 is executed,
i.e., the security mechanism does the action “deny the request and keep the user away from the target”; in any other cases,
the function maps a decision to an appropriate action from the execution space based on what the decision is.
Under this framework, we have
Theorem 1. Let Θ = 〈U ,T ,P,D,F ,G〉 be the model of a DACA. Suppose the model satisﬁes Property 1, then if for any t ∈ T , the AC
decision function and enforcement function are deﬁned in the way given above, then the model satisﬁes Property 2.
Proof. If for any t ∈ T , at any time, a user u accesses t for a service st (i.e., doAccessFor(u, t, st) is true), then gt has taken
an action different from e1. That happens only when Q is true. 
This theorem indicates that the design at abstract level in fact provides a method for implementing a DACA based on
our model.
5.3. Remarks
What is the difference between the traditional access control model and our model? In the traditional model, the decision
making is based only on the conditions in the policy rule. For example, if we have rule
allowAccessFor
(
u, t, st
)→ C1(u, t, st)∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st),
then the decision function is
C1
(
u, t, st
)∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st)→ allowAccessFor(u, t, st).
That is, if C1(u, t, st) ∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st) is true, the request is accepted; otherwise it is denied. While in our model, the
decision making is based on not only the conditions in the policy, but also the observation vector. With the above policy
rule, in our model, even if C1(u, t, st) ∧ · · · ∧ Cn(u, t, st) is true, the request may yet be denied or an answer given that is
not a simple acceptance (such as the need to wait or the need for a further approval etc.). Therefore, our model is more
ﬂexible, and is able to handle a variety of different access control requirements.
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The reason for this is that the global condition in fact is not overtly consulted in decision making. The local policy should
be consistent with the global policy, but it is generally stronger than the global policy. Generally, if the conditions in a
local policy are satisﬁed, the global condition must also be satisﬁed; the decision to the user’s request therefore certainly
depends on the local policy. This is the reason why the global condition is not overtly involved in the AC decision function.
6. Implementation
In this section, we discuss issues regarding implementation of a DACA. First we present an approach to map the abstract
design to a real system using an example, then we discuss general requirements that we usually meet in the implementation
process of a DACA.
6.1. Mapping abstract design to a real DACA
Recall Example 2 featuring the security room sr, providing two services Ssr = {S_View, R_View}. We assume that Alice,
Bob and Peter belong to U , and the database dsr contains the following facts and rules:
clearedFor(alice, S_Class). clearedFor(peter, S_Class).
clearedFor(bob, R_Class). member(alice).
R_Class < S_Class. supervisor(alice,peter).
clearedFor(X, L1) ∧ (L2 < L1) → clearedFor(X, L2).
Based on the discussion in the previous section, we should have, for example, the following policy rules in the policy
psr:
allowAccessFor(u, sr, R_View) → clearedFor(u, R_Class).
allowAccessFor(u, sr, S_View) → clearedFor(u, S_Class) ∧member(u).
Here one rule corresponds with the service R_View, the other with the service S_View. As discussed in the previous section,
the policy may also contain/need some auxiliary policy rules. With this example, we have the following auxiliary rule in
psr:
member(X) ∧ supervisor(X, Y ) → (reqCredFrom(Y , X) → member(Y )).
This rule is viewed as the credential obtaining rule: a member X can introduce someone Y to be a new member if
Y obtains a credential from X . The third rule is assumed speciﬁcally for sr. Thus, since we have member(alice) and
supervisor(alice,peter) in dsr , member(peter) could be derived based on this rule if Peter is willing to obtain such a cre-
dential with Alice’s help.
In addition, according to Deﬁnition 1, policy psr may keep a copy of the global policy in it. With this example, we assume
the global policy is
allowAccessFor(u, t, s) → clearedFor(u, s),
given the assumptions in Section 3.3 and that the observation vector space, denoted O, consists of the following elements:
o1 = (empty,no_full,nil), o2 = (empty,no_full, S_View),
o3 = (empty,no_full, R_View), o4 = (empty, full,nil),
o5 = (empty, full, S_View), o6 = (empty, full, R_View),
o7 = (occupied,no_full,nil), o8 = (occupied,no_full, S_View),
o9 = (occupied,no_full, R_View), o10 = (occupied, full,nil),
o11 = (occupied, full, S_View), and o12 = (occupied, full, R_View).
Further, we design an answer set containing the following answers or decisions:
a1 = No, a2 = Yes,
a3 = YesButWait, a4 = YesButFilterForR_ViewFirst,
a5 = YesButObtainMembershipThroughCredentialObtained.
Based on the policy and database given above, mapping the abstract AC decision function to the real application, we can
deﬁne an appropriate decision function used for sr.
fsr
(
u, ssr
)
(o) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a2 if ssr = S_View & u = alice & (o = o1 or o2 or o3),
a3 if ssr = S_View & u = alice & (o = o1 & o = o2 & o = o3),
a5 if ssr = S_View & u = peter & for any o ∈ O,
a2 if ssr = R_View & u = alice or bob or peter & (o = o1 or o2 or o3),
a3 if ssr = R_View & u = alice or bob or peter & (o = o1 & o = o2 & o = o3),
a otherwise.1
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In order to deﬁne the AC enforcement function gsr , we also need to design/identify the execution space E . We assume
E contains the following actions:
e1 = (deny the request, keep u away from sr),
e2 = (tell u Ok, but wait for vacancy),
e3 = (tell u Ok, but obtain membership through credential obtained),
e4 = (ﬁlter for R_View, then let u get in), and
e5 = (let u get in).
Then mapping the abstract AC enforcement function to a real enforcement function, we deﬁne
gsr
(
u, ssr, v
)
( fsr) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
e5 if fsr = a2,
e2 if fsr = a3,
e4 if fsr = a4 & ssr = R_View,
e3 if fsr = a5,
e1 otherwise.
6.2. Implementation process
Based on the abstract model to implement a DACA, it is important to have an idealized speciﬁcation. To do this, we may
ﬁrst need to obtain the answers to the following questions: What targets (servers) may be included in the architecture?
What services may be provided by each target? What policy associated with a target is needed? What requirements are
needed for each target as well as the whole system? These questions/requirements are usually answered by the clients who
will work with the architecture.
The next step is to design the security mechanisms (or AC functions) for implementing the architecture. Based on the
process of abstract design, this includes: identifying the key factors to form the observation vector and determine the vector
space; designing an appropriate answer set for deﬁning the decision function; and identifying the actions which the security
mechanism may take to produce the execution space for deﬁning the enforcement function. Therefore, the main steps of an
implementation process for a DACA may include:
1. writing speciﬁcation (details of the targets, services, potential users, policies/requirements etc.),
2. formalizing policy and building databases that include information used for authenticating users and other service
information, and
3. mapping abstract AC functions to the practical application and implementing all the functions.
The process is also involved in the analysis of the correctness of policy and implementation.
It is evident that the abstract model supports dynamic changes to the architecture. Adding and removing components to
and from the architecture does not affect other components. It is also easy to take away a service from a server, or create a
new service within it. Another advantage is that the system can be improved if some ﬂaws are identiﬁed.
6.3. Model checking for the correctness analysis
When developing a system, the correctness of the system must be checked. Model checking [6] is a popular method
used for this purpose. In the following, we outline how we intend to apply the SMV model checker [14] for the design and
analysis of a practical DACA throughout the implementation procedure.
Once a Java or Prolog program is obtained to implement a policy, we create an SMV program (module) to verify the
implementation by checking
• whether the policy is correctly implemented by the (Prolog/Java) program;
• whether desired security properties are satisﬁed by the implementation; and
• whether the policy is consistent with the global policy (and/or other policies) in the DACA.
Model checking helps the system designer as well as the policy maker. It can be applied to effectively deal with dynamic
changes in a DACA. Although preliminary work has been done to demonstrably integrate this model checking approach in
our project, for the sake of brevity we leave this work as the subject for future work.
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An abstract dynamic access control architecture has been presented. The model accurately describes the abstract struc-
ture, components, and interactions of a real dynamic access control architecture. We have also discussed the properties that
a DACA must satisfy, and shown how to design appropriate AC functions to guarantee that the architecture can satisfy the
required properties.
Traditional access control deals only with authorization decisions on access by initiators (users) to targets (resources).
The abstract model for a DACA as the meta-level structure of the access control architecture deals with not only the security
aspects (obligations and conditions, etc.), but also dynamic changes (of the architecture). Researchers have proposed some
other ideas, such as Fuzzy MLS [5], to extend classical access control concepts. Sandhu and Park [17] also propose a model,
called the ABC model, for usage control (UCON) that is a generalization of access control covering obligations, conditions,
continuity and mutability. Our abstract model for DACAs is more general, which can handle various scenarios of access con-
trol where the security policy, context and even the DACA itself can be highly dynamic. Furthermore, we have theoretically
proved that the AC functions deﬁned in our method can certainly satisfy the properties required.
The future work may include: providing tools to support policy formalization, and investigating methods and techniques
for modeling the relation between trust and risk in DACAs. We also intend to further discuss the integration of the correct-
ness analysis.
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